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RECENT DECISIONS 
ATIORNEY AND CLIENT-SCOPE OF ATIORNEY'S AUTHORITY-CLIENT BOUND 
BY WRONGFUL SETILEMENT OF CLAIM-Plaintiff hired an attorney to 
prosecute a claim for damages resulting from the alleged negligence of 
defendant, a chiropodist, in the treatment of plaintiff's wife. Three years 
after the institution of the suit plaintiff discovered that his attorney 
had agreed with defendant to settle the suit and had forged plaintiff's 
name to a release and to a bank draft given by defendant in settlement of 
the claim. Plaintiff immediately instituted action to have the settle-
ment stipulation deleted from the record and to have the case reinstated 
for hearing. On appeal from the trial court's decision for plaintiff, held, 
reversed. While the mere engagement of an attorney does not imply 
authority to compromise the claim, in the instant case defendant was 
justified in assuming that the attorney was authorized to effect a com-
promise. Of two innocent parties before the court the one more re-
sponsible for the wrong should bear the loss. Cohen v. Goldman, (R.I. 
1957) 132 A. (2d) 414. 
In England1 and in a few jurisdictions in the United States2 it has 
been held that a general retainer gives authority to an attorney to com-
promise his client's claim. But the decided majority of courts in the 
United States have held that an attorney derives from a bare general 
retainer no power to compromise his client's cause of action.3 A client 
may disregard an unauthorized compromise4 or move to have it set 
aside.5 In the absence of apparent authority in the attorney a party dealing 
with him is presumed to be on notice of the limits of his authority6 and 
acts at his own risk.7 However, either subsequent ratification of the 
1 Chown v. Parrott, 14 C.B.N.S. 74, 143 Eng. Rep. 372 (1863); Neale v. Lady 
Gordon Lennox, [1902] 1 K.B. 838; Prestwich v. Poley, 18 C.B.N.S. 806, 144 Eng. 
Rep. 662 (1865). Contra, Swinfen v. Swinfen, 24 Beav. 549, 53 Eng. Rep. 470 (1857). 
2 Strattner v. Wilmington City Electric Co., 19 Del. 453, 53 A. 436 (1901); 
Bonney v. Morrill, 57 Me. 368 (1870). See 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 523 at 526 (1911), stating 
that Maine is the only state positively to assert that an attorney has the power 
to compromise. 
3 E.g., United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343 (1900); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 
(2d Cir. 1955) 229 F. (2d) 423. See 30 A.L.R. (2d) 945, §2 (1953); 1 THORNTON, AT-
TORNEYS AT LAW 388 (1914), asserting that Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
South Carolina apply the rule but with variations. 
4 Sherman & Sons Co. v. Princess Shirt Mfg. Co., 213 App. Div. 140, 210 N.Y.S. 
100 (1925); Dawson v. Hotchkiss, 160 Va. 577, 169 S.E. 564 (1933). 
5 National Bread Co. v. Bird, 226 Ala. 40, 145 S. 462 (1933); Melton v. Kemp, 
209 Ky. 672, 273 S.W. 488 (1925); Dawson v. Hotchkiss, note 4 supra; Application 
of Glebe Juniors, Inc., 199 Misc. 943, 105 N.Y.S. (2d) 621 (1951), revd. without op. 
279 App. Div. 653, 108 N.Y.S. (2d) 996 (1951). 
6 Gibson v. Nelson, lll Minn. 183, 126 N.W. 731 (1910); National Bread Co. 
v. Bird, note 5 supra. 
7 Precious v. O'Rourke, 270 Mass. 305, 170 N.E. no (1930). 
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compromise by the client8 or proof of his having clothed his attorney 
with apparent authority9 will serve to sustain the compromise. Moreover, 
the compromise may be binding if made in an emergency situation in 
which the attorney had no opportunity to consult his client.10 The op-
posing English and American doctrines are based on differing views 
of the attorney-client relationship.11 A few courts have qualified the 
American rule by applying a test of reasonableness to the compromise,12 
but the vast majority of the courts adhere to the rule without qualifi-
cation.13 The court in the principal case acknowledged the American 
rule14 but refused to apply it to the instant fact situation on the basis 
of two arguments: (1) the attorney had apparent authority to make 
the compromise;15 and (2) since one of two innocent parties must suffer, 
the one who constituted the wrongdoer his agent should bear the loss.16 
The latter argument would appear to be unsound.17 The court's basis for 
s Baumgartner v. Whinney, 156 Pa. Super 167, 39 A. (2d) 738 (1944); Dawson 
v. Hotchkiss, note 4 supra; National Bread Co. v. Bird, note 5 supra. See 30 A.L.R. 
(2d) 955, §12 (1953). 
9 Rader v. Campbell, 134 W. Va. 485, 61 S.E. (2d) 228 (1950); Gelber v. Loew's, 
Inc., 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 798 (1944), affd. without op. 273 App. Div. 845, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 
132 (1948); Petition of Trinidad Corp., note 3 supra. See 30 A.L.R. (2d) 957, §13 
(1953). 
10 E.g., Lewis v. Vache, 92 Colo. 358, 20 P. (2d) 554 (1933). 
11 The English view is that once the client selects his attorney he turns full 
control of his cause of action over to him. The rationale underlying this view is 
that the attorney should have the right to handle all matters involving the case he 
has been given because he is the expert in the law. See Neale v. Lady Gordon 
Lennox, note I supra; WHARTON, AGENCY AND AGENTS §590, p. 388 (1876). The 
American courts, on the other hand, view the attorney as a limited agent because 
they consider a claim to be a personal matter. -Under this theory when a client 
hires an attorney he confers upon him the powers necessary for the conduct of 
the claim, but the right to conclude it for less than full value is the client's alone. 
See Seifert v. Gallet, 159 Minn. 131, 198 N.W. 664 (1924); WEEKS, ATTORNEYS AND 
COUNSELLORS AT LAW 474 (1892). 
12 Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 436 (1813), appears to be the origin 
of this line of reasoning. Chief Justice Marshall, in deciding that an unauthorized 
compromise by an attorney was not binding on his client, indicated that the court 
would not disturb such a compromise if it was a reasonable one. Whipple v. 
Whitman, 13 R.I. 512 (1882), cited in the principal case, applies Marshall's reason-
ing in a decision upholding a compromise made by an attorney without the knowl-
edge of his client. It should be noted, however, that in that case the court also 
found evidence of !aches, ratification of the compromise, and an express delegation 
of authority to the attorney ,by the wife of the plaintiff for whom the plaintiff 
was bringing the suit on assignment. 
13 See note 3 supra. To hold othenvise is to undermine the American rule 
by allowing the court to substitute its own opinion for that of the client. 
14 Principal case at 416. 
15 Id. at 417. 
l0ibid. 
17 The advisability of using this nebulous and virtually unlimited equitable 
maxim to solve specific legal problems is subject to a good deal of question. A con-
sistent and logical application of the principle in the present area would preclude 
the existence of any sort of limited agency and come close to making a principal 
responsible for every wrongful act of his agent. · 
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applying the former argument to the present case is not clear. The 
doctrine of apparent authority is based upon estoppel;18 it does not 
constitute an exception to the American rule, as does the emergency 
situation case, but is an independent legal principle. Consequently, it is 
essential that there be sufficient evidence to justify the application of 
estoppel before an unauthorized compromise is allowed to stand in the 
face of the general rule.19 It would seem that the appearance of authority 
mentioned by the Rhode Island court refers to evidence that the client 
presented his attorney to the defendant.:!O Since making one's attorney 
known to the other party, either personally or through his attorney, is 
the almost universal case, in effect this is to say that the mere hiring 
of an attorney confers on him sufficient apparent authority to invoke the 
principle of estoppel against his client. This is in direct conflict with 
the American rule21 and is not supported by the other cases which have 
sustained compromises on the basis of apparent authority.22 Therefore, 
as an application of the American rule the decision in the principal case 
would not appear to be supported by policy, logic, or authority. 
Robert M. Vorsanger 
18 Czesna v. Lietuva Loan &: Savings Assn., 252 Ill. App. 612 (1929). See 
MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., 54 (1952); FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY 228 (1954). But see 
Cook, "Agency by Estoppel," 5 CoL. L. REV. 36 (1905). 
19 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 219 Ark. 219, 242 S.W. (2d) 124 (1951). 
20 Principal case at 417. 
21 If the mere hiring of an attorney were sufficient to invoke an estoppel against the 
client the rule would be completely destroyed. A rule of law that an attorney cannot 
compromise his client's claim without express authority is useless if the very act of hiring 
the attorney precludes the client from relying upon this limitation on the attorney's 
authority. 
22 See note 9 supra. 
